По напорен ден со одредени теоретски концепти решив да го пуштам мозокот на пасење, но како што е редот со интернет платформите наидов на една дебата во коментари на Јутјуб која се однесуваше на физикализмот, односно дека сите наши чувства како омразата, тагата, љубовта, среќата итн. парафразирано се само хемиски реакции кои се случуваат во мозокот.
И сега знам дека Хајек можеби и премногу го форсирав на блогов, но човекот има одлична дискусија, односно дава една прекрасна критика на ваквото поимање на физикализмот во една негова не толку позната книга The Sensory Order (1952) која се бави со теоретска психологија. Од порано ја имав ѕирнато книгата и не оти разбрав многу многу, но ми останаа во сеќавање неколку параграфи кои се бавеа со оваа проблематика и тука ќе ги ставам во целост на англиски. Зошто? Па онака, можеби на некого ќе му биде интересна оваа проблематика која има и филозофски шмек, но и која претставува значајна дебата околу методологијата во комплексните науки. А и уморен сум кога во разговор со пријатели, секој пат кога ќе се начне оваа тема ја слушам оваа позиција за која човек знае некако одвнатре дека не може да ја прифати, дека сѐ што му се случува не е само хемиска реакција. Секако Хајековиот аргумент е многу подлабок од ова и отвора значајни прашања.
F.A. Hayek: The Division of the Sciences and Freedom of the Will – 191, 192 и 193 стр. Респективно
„The conclusion to which our theory leads is thus that to us not only mind as a whole but also all individual mental processes must forever remain phenomena of a special kind which, although produced by the same principles which we know to operate in the physical world, we shall never be able fully to explain in terms of physical laws. Those whom it pleases may express this by saying that in some ultimate sense mental phenomena are ‘nothing but’ physical processes; this, however, does not alter the fact that in discussing mental processes we will never be able to dispense with the use of mental terms, and that we shall have permanently to be content with a practical dualism, a dualism based not on any assertion of an objective difference between the two classes of events, but on the demonstrable limitations of the powers of our own mind fully to comprehend the unitary order to which they belong.
8.88. From the fact that we shall never be able to achieve more than an ‘explanation of the principle’ by which the order of mental events is determined, it also follows that we shall never achieve a complete ‘unification’ of all sciences in the sense that all phenomena of which it treats can be described in physical terms. In the study of human action, in particular, our starting point will always have to be our direct knowledge of the different kinds of mental events, which to us must remain irreducible entities.
8.89. The permanent cleavage between our knowledge of the physical world and our knowledge of mental events goes right through what is commonly regarded as the one subject of psychology. Since the theoretical psychology which has been sketched here can never be developed to the point at which it would enable us to substitute for the description of particular mental events descriptions in terms of particular physical events, and since it has therefore nothing to say about particular kinds of mental events, but is confined to describing the kind of physical processes by which the various types of mental processes can be produced, any discussion of mental events which is to get beyond such a mere ‘explanation of the principle’ will have to start from the mental entities which we know from direct experience.
8.90. This does not mean that we may not be able in a different sense to ‘explain particular mental events: it merely means that the type of explanation at which we aim in the physical sciences is not applicable to mental events. We can still use our direct (‘introspective’) knowledge of mental events in order to ‘understand, and in some measure even to predict, the results to which mental processes will lead in certain conditions. But this introspective psychology, the part of psychology which lies on the other side of the great cleavage which divides it from the physical sciences, will always have to take our direct knowledge of the human mind for its starting point. It will derive its statements about some mental processes from its knowledge about other mental processes, but it will never be able to bridge the gap between the realm of the mental and the realm of the physical.
8.91. Such a verstehende psychology, which starts from our given knowledge of mental processes, will, however, never be able to explain why we must think thus and not otherwise, why we arrive at particular conclusions. Such an explanation would presuppose a knowledge of the physical conditions under which we would arrive at different conclusions. The assertion that we can explain our own knowledge involves also the belief that we can at any one moment of time both act on some knowledge and possess some additional knowledge about how the former is conditioned and determined. The whole idea of the mind explaining itself is a logical contradiction—nonsense in the literal meaning of the word—and a result of the prejudice that we must be able to deal with mental events in the same manner as we deal with physical events.
8.92. In particular, it would appear that the whole aim of the discipline known under the name of ‘sociology of knowledge which aims at explaining why people as a result of particular material circumstances hold particular views at particular moments, is fundamentally misconceived. It aims at precisely that kind of specific explanation of mental phenomena from physical facts which we have tried to show to be impossible. All we can hope to do in this field is to aim at an explanation of the principle such as is attempted by the general theory of knowledge or epistemology.
8.93. It may be noted in passing that these considerations also have some bearing on the age-old controversy about the ‘freedom of the will’. Even though we may know the general principle by which all human action is causally determined by physical processes, this would not mean that to us a particular human action can ever be recognizable as the necessary result of a particular set of physical circumstances. To us human decisions must always appear as the result of the whole of a human personality—that means the whole of a person’s mind—which, as we have seen, we cannot reduce to something else.
8.94. The recognition of the fact that for our understanding of human action familiar mental entities must always remain the last determinants to which we can penetrate, and that we cannot hope to replace them by physical facts, is, of course, of the greatest importance for all the disciplines which aim at an understanding and interpretation of human action. It means, in particular, that the devices developed by the natural sciences for the special purpose of replacing a description of the world in sensory or phenomenal terms by one in physical terms lose their raison d’etre in the study of intelligible human action. This applies particularly to the endeavour to replace all qualitative statements by quantitative expressions or by descriptions which run exclusively in terms of explicit relations.
8.95. The impossibility of any complete ‘unification’ of all our scientific knowledge into an all-comprehensive physical science has hardly less significance, however, for our understanding of the physical world than it has for our study of the consequences of human action.”
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